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Recent and Potentially Forthcoming Developments in Fed-
eral Regulation of the Workplace
I. Introduction
Now is a particularly apt time to review
and take stock of recent and possibly
looming changes in federal workplace
regulations. With a change of
administrations in Washington, par-
ticularly one involving a change in the
party in power, often come changes, or
at least the anticipation of changes, in
labor and employment law.  This year
has been no exception.  The current
economic crisis has given new impetus
to proposals to modify regulations
affecting the labor market and the
rights of stakeholders in that market.
As a result, there have been several
significant changes in the last twelve
months, with others yet anticipated,
even beyond much-discussed propos-
als to change the National Labor
Relations Act, which subject is beyond
the scope of this article.
Amendments to the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)1, and to
the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA)2 and FMLA regulations3  were
adopted in late-2008, but are still being
absorbed by employers and employee
organizations.  Important changes to
several federal antidiscrimination
laws in the form of the "Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act,"4  and to employees'
COBRA rights as part of the federal
economic "stimulus" package,5  were
signed into law in early-2009.  Still
other measures are pending in
Congress or with federal agencies
amid expectations that proposals may
soon be adopted, because they appear
to enjoy the support of the new
administration.  This article will
review some these recent and pending
changes and consider how these
changes may impact the workplace,
particularly for public employers and
employees in Illinois.
II. Amendments to the ADA
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008,6
effective January 1, 2009, substan-
tially revised the definition of
"disability" to overrule certain court
decisions that were seen as having
unduly limited the ADA's scope.  From
its inception, the ADA has protected
qualified individuals who have "a
physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major
life activities of such individual,"
individuals who have "a record of such
an impairment," and those who are
"regarded as having such an impair-
ment."7   In 2002, however, in Toyota
Motor Manufacturing Kentucky, Inc.
v. Williams,8 the Supreme Court ruled
that the terms "substantially limits"
and "major life activities" should be
interpreted strictly to create a
"demanding standard" for qualifying
as disabled.9  The ADA Amendments
thoroughly countermand that judicial
directive, requiring instead that the
"definition of disability be construed in
favor of broad coverage of individuals
… to the maximum extent permitted
by the terms" of the Act.10
A. When Is An Impairment
“Substantially Limit[ing]”?
Supreme Court interpretations
before the ADA Amendments indi-
cated that an individual's impairment
had to "prevent or severely restrict"
the individual's performance of "major
life activities" to be protected by the
ADA.11 According to the Court, the
individual had to be "presently – not
potentially or hypothetically – sub-
stantially limited."12 Finally, the
Court held that the availability of
"mitigating measures" could deprive
an otherwise qualifying impairment of
protection, since an impairment
"corrected by mitigating measures
does not substantially limit."13   The
Supreme Court even held that an
otherwise qualifying disability could
be rendered non-disabling not only by
external "mitigating measurers like
artificial aids," but also by "measures
undertaken, whether consciously or
not, within the body's own systems."14
That is, where a person's body
naturally adapts to or otherwise
compensates for an impairment, the
person might not be deemed substan-
tially limited in a major life activity.
In the ADA Amendments Act,




these Supreme Court interpreta-
tions.15 Rather than substitute new
statutory language elucidating the
"substantially limits" requirement,
Congress left it to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) to "revise that portion of
current [ADA] regulations that defines
the term 'substantially limits' as
'significantly restricted.'"16  Further,
the Amendments commanded that the
determination of whether a condition
"substantially limits" an individual
henceforth should "be made without
regard to the ameliorative effects of
mitigating measures."17  The Amend-
ments specify mitigating measures
that should not be considered,
including medications, medical sup-
plies, prosthetic limbs, low-vision
devices, mobility devices, and oxygen
therapy equipment, as well as such
natural mitigating measures as
"learned behavioral or adaptive neuro-
logical modifications."18   The Amend-
ments make clear that whether an
individual happens to be presently in
good health does not matter; rather,
"[a]n impairment that is episodic or in
remission is a disability if it would
substantially limit a major life
activity when active."19
B. What is A “Major Life Activ-
ity”
The ADA Amendments also over-
turn a Supreme Court interpretation20
that the term "major life activities"
means only those activities that are of
"central importance to most people's
daily lives."21 The Amendments
broaden the term by setting forth a
more comprehensive list of illustrative
human activities, both volitional and
non-volitional.  The list includes:
caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleep-
ing, walking, standing, lifting, bend-
ing, speaking, breathing, learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking,
communicating, and working, as well
as non-volitional bodily functions,
including the immune system, normal
cell growth, digestive system, bowels,
bladder, neurological system, brain,
respiratory system, circulatory sys-
tem, endocrine system, and reproduc-
tive system.22 The Amendments reaf-
firm that an impairment need only
limit a single major life activity to be
considered a disability.23
Although the ADA Amendments
significantly expand what constitutes
a major life activity, some relatively
routine activities evidently still do not
qualify.  For example, several courts
have held that an impairment does not
constitute a protected "disability"
merely because it limits an individual's
ability to operate a motor vehicle,
reasoning that driving a car is not a
major life activity, at least in urban
areas where public transportation is
available.24 The Seventh Circuit,
while deciding a case that arose under
the pre-amendment ADA, recently
suggested that even the broader list of
major life activities in the ADA
Amendments supports this view.25
Also noticeably absent from the
ADA Amendments is any discussion or
clarification of the so-called "single-job
rule," under which it has been held
that, for an individual to be
substantially limited in the major life
activity of "working," the individual
must be precluded from a broad class
or range of jobs instead of merely one
job or type of job.26  Evidently the
single-job rule survives the Amend-
ments.
C. "Regarded As” Disabled
The ADA long has protected non-
disabled persons who incorrectly are
"regarded as" having a disability.
Previously, however, to satisfy the
"regarded as" prong, an individual had
to be wrongly perceived as having an
impairment that would qualify as a
disability by substantially limiting
performance of a major life activity.27
The ADA Amendments change this
as well.  The Amendments prescribe
that an individual now is "regarded as"
disabled if the individual is subjected
to discrimination based on an "actual
or perceived physical or mental
impairment whether or not the
impairment limits or is perceived to
limit a major life activity."28  Thus, in
effect, an individual now may qualify
for protection under the ADA's
"regarded as" provision more easily
than one who claims to be actually
disabled.  The "regarded as" individual
must merely demonstrate that an
employer perceived him or her to have
an impairment, and discriminated
because of it; the individual need not
show that the perceived impairment
would limit a major life activity, as
long as what the employer perceives is
not a mere transitory impairment.29   A
"transitory" impairment is "an im-
pairment with an actual or expected
duration of 6 months or less."30
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D. Practical Significance of the
ADA Amendments
The Amendments substantially
liberalize the ADA so as to make it  less
likely for an individual to be denied
legal protection because his or her
condition seems insufficiently limiting
or too-readily ameliorated.  One likely
practical result is  that employers and
labor organizations charged with ADA
violations will be less successful in
avoiding ADA trials through motions
for summary judgment. The Amend-
ments  probably make it more difficult
for a court to conclude, without a trial,
that the nature of an individual's
physical or mental impairment falls
clearly short of what is required for
statutory protection.
This is significant mainly as a
matter of litigation strategy.  Being
able to avoid trial through summary
judgment has obvious value to ADA
defendants, once they are defendants.
But most employers and unions prefer
to avoid lawsuits in the first place.
Therefore, in their daily activities,
potential defendants should focus less
on whether an individual can show
that he or she is substantially limited
in a major life activity, and more on
whether the individual's impairment
interferes with job performance and, if
so, whether it can be reasonably
accommodated.
This is especially true in Illinois,
particularly in the public sector,
where claims of disability discrimina-
tion in employment may, and for 11th
Amendment reasons sometimes must,
be litigated under the Illinois Human
Rights Act (IHRA).31    Under the IHRA,
whether an individual's physical or
mental impairment substantially
limits a major life activity is largely
irrelevant since the IHRA protects
disabled individuals against discrimi-
nation without resorting to those
terms.  An individual is protected
under the IHRA if he or she has a non-
transitory "determinable physical or
mental characteristic," whether con-
genital or as a result of an injury or
disease, which is unrelated to the
individual's ability to perform the
job.32  Also, effective January 2008,
claims under the  IHRA are triable in
Illinois courts,33  which generally are
considered disinclined to grant sum-
mary judgment.
III. Revisions to the Family and
Medical Leave Act and Rules
The Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) was amended by the National
Defense Authorization Act of 200834  to
allow eligible employees of covered
employers to take new and additional
kinds of FMLA leave.  The amend-
ments provide for FMLA leave because
of a "qualifying exigency" that involves
an employee's spouse, child, parent or
next of kin being called to, or serving
in, the Armed Forces.  In addition, the
amendments provide for FMLA leave
for an employee to care for a covered
Armed Forces member who becomes
ill or incurs an injury while on active
military duty.
In November 2008, the U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL) promul-
gated new FMLA regulations35which
implement these  military-related
leave provisions and  overhaul
provisions of the regulations that
govern traditional FMLA leaves.  The
revised regulations make several
significant changes to what many
view as an already complex regulatory
scheme, although the DOL describes
some of the changes as intended
merely to clarify or simplify the
original rules.  This section will first
discuss the new military-related leave
provisions, and then some of the other
changes wrought by the regulatory
overhaul.
A. Military Caregiver Leave
The FMLA Amendments allow
eligible employees up to 26 workweeks
of leave, during a 12-month period, to
care for certain family members who
become ill or injured in the Armed
Forces.36    However, such an employee
is entitled to no more than a combined
total of 26 weeks of FMLA leave for all
FMLA-qualifying reasons, including
the employee's care of the
servicemember and any other FMLA
leave the employee may take for his/
her own serious health condition, or
the birth or adoption of a child, or to
care for a non-service-member spouse
or parent or child, or for "qualified
exigency" leave during that 12-month
period.37
This can get complicated. The
FMLA Amendments allow an eligible
employee to take up to 26 weeks of
leave in a unique 12-month period to
care for one covered servicemember,
and then take up to another 26 weeks
of leave – starting another 12-month
period – to care for a different covered
servicemember, or even for the same
servicemember with a different injury
or illness. Obviously, these 12-month
periods during which one employee
may be caring for multiple covered
servicemembers can overlap. That is,
at any particular moment an employer
may have to keep track of a single
employee's use of FMLA leave
according to several different 12-
month periods. As discussed below, the
possibly multiple 12-month periods
triggered by an employee's use of
military-caregiving leaves can be
different from the 12-month period in
which the employer already may have
been monitoring that employee's use of
traditional FMLA leave.
Apart from possible confusion
concerning these 12-month measur-
ing periods, the factors governing
eligibility for military-caregiver leave
are comparable to the factors govern-
ing eligibility for traditional FMLA
leave. The employee must be the
spouse, daughter, son, parent or next
of kin of the covered servicemember.38
The term "covered servicemember"
includes members of the Armed
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Forces, including members of the
National Guard or Reserves, if the
member has incurred a serious injury
or illness for which he or she is
undergoing medical treatment or
therapy, is in outpatient status, is in
recuperation, or is on the military's
temporary disability retired list.39  A
"serious injury or illness" must be one
that was incurred in the line of duty
while the servicemember was on
active duty, and that could render the
servicemember medically unfit to
perform his or her duties.40
As indicated, the 12-month period
during which an eligible employee
may take up to 26 weeks of FMLA
leave to care for a covered
servicemember begins on the first day
the employee takes such leave for a
particular covered servicemember's
injury or illness and ends 12 months
later.41  As stated, however, an eligible
employee may take up to another 26
weeks of such military-caregiver leave
to care for another covered
servicemember, or to care for the same
covered servicemember if he or she
incurs a subsequent serious injury or
illness.  In that event, the first day of
that subsequent caregiver leave starts
a separate 12-month period in which
that additional 26 weeks of leave may
be taken, even if the second 12-month
period thus commences before the first
12-month period has elapsed.42
Thus, an initial difference with
military caregiver leave is that an
employer has no option to select the 12-
month period in which to calculate an
employee's use of military-caregiver
leave as it may for other types of FMLA
leave.43 In addition, it clearly is
possible for a single employee to be
subject to multiple overlapping 12-
month periods during which the
employee is entitled to use FMLA leave
for different purposes.  It is not clear
whether an employee who has taken
non-military-caregiver FMLA leave
shortly before beginning a qualifying
military-caregiver leave continues to
be subject, after commencing the
military-caregiver leave, to the sepa-
rate 12-month period that governed
the employee's use of the non-military-
caregiver leave.  The revised regula-
tions state that, within the "single 12-
month period" that commences with
an eligible employee's first use of
military-caregiver leave, "the em-
ployee is entitled to no more than 12
weeks of leave" for traditional FMLA
reasons and qualifying military
exigencies, so that such an employee
may, for example, "during the ‘single
12-month period,’ take 16 weeks of
FMLA leave to care for a covered
servicemember and 10 weeks of FMLA
leave to care for a newborn child."44
Assume, however, that this hypotheti-
cal employee used three weeks of
FMLA leave due to the employee's own
serious health condition in January,
before beginning his 16 weeks of
covered servicemember leave in
March.  After the employee completes
the 16 weeks of covered servicemember
leave that June, is he still eligible for
another 10 weeks of FMLA leave to
care for his newborn starting in July,
as the new regulation indicates?
Considering the employee as  eligible
for another ten weeks of FMLA leave
will mean that the employee takes a
total of no more than 26 weeks during
the period beginning in March.
However, it could mean a total of 13
weeks of traditional FMLA leave
during the 12 months that commenced
with the employee's initial personal
illness leave in January.
B. Qualifying Exigency Leave
The FMLA Amendments also
authorize an eligible employee to take
up to 12 weeks of FMLA leave for
certain other military-related exigen-
cies that arise out of the fact that a
spouse, son, daughter, or parent of the
employee is on, or is called to, active
military duty.45  The revised FMLA
Regulations specify that "qualifying
exigencies" for this kind of leave
include:
(1)  Short-notice deployment.
(2)  Military events and related
      activities.
(3)  Childcare and school
      activities.
(4)  Financial and legal arrange-
      ments.
(5)  Counseling.
(6)  Rest and recuperation.
(7)  Post-deployment activities.
(8)  Additional activities.46
Unlike military caregiver leaves
discussed above, the 12-month period
for "qualifying exigency" leave seems
to be the same as the 12-month period
governing leave taken for "tradi-
tional," non-military-related FMLA
reasons.
C. Other FMLA Rule Changes
The revised FMLA Regulations
incorporate numerous other changes,
representing a substantial overhaul of
the initial rules.  Some of the revisions
also may be significant.
For example, the revised Regula-
tions delete language that had been
interpreted to provide that an eligible
employee encountering an immediate
and unforeseeable need for FMLA
leave could not be required to notify his
employer of the FMLA-qualifying
reasons for his absence sooner than
two business days after the fact.47   The
revised Regulations continue to state
that such an employee must notify the
employer "as soon as practicable"48
but, instead of indicating that this
"ordinarily would mean … within one
or two business days," now provide
that "it should be practicable for the
employee to provide notice of the need
for leave either the same day or the
next business day."49 The DOL's
Preamble to the final revised Regula-
tions indicates that this change is
intended to allow employers to enforce
their normal employee call-in require-
ments except where unusual circum-
stances prevent an FMLA-qualified
individual from complying.50  Subse-
quently, the DOL has rescinded its
5
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1999 opinion letter, which seemed to
assure an employee of up to two
business days to notify his employer of
the FMLA reasons for his absence,51
and substituted a new opinion letter,
which states:
[I]n the example . . .  of an employer
policy requiring employees to call
in one hour prior to their shift to
report absences and an employee
who is absent on Tuesday and
Wednesday, but does not call in on
either day and instead provides
notice of his need for FMLA leave
when he returns to work on
Thursday, it is our opinion that
unless unusual circumstances
prevented the employee from
providing notice consistent with
the employer's policy, the em-
ployer may deny FMLA leave for
the absence.52
The revised FMLA Regulations also
modify a provision that previously
forbade an employer to contact an
employee's healthcare provider to
clarify an FMLA medical certification
that the provider completed, except
with the employee's express permis-
sion and through another healthcare
provider representing the employer.53
The revised rule now permits an
employer, through a human resources
representative or other management
official who is not the employee's direct
supervisor, to contact the employee's
healthcare provider for such a
clarification regardless of the
employee's authorization, as long as
the employer first gives the employee
seven days to cure the confusion or
lack of clarity in the certification.54
The revised FMLA Regulations also
now permit an employer to apply to
FMLA leaves the employer's policies
regarding the minimum increments
in which employees may use leave
time, as long as the minimum
increment is no more than one hour.55
Thus, for example, if an employer
allows sick leave to be used in
increments of no less than 30 minutes,
and an employee reports to work 20
minutes late for an FMLA-qualifying
reason, the employer may give the
employee the choice to wait until 30
minutes after his or her normal start
time before commencing work, and
thus to use 30 minutes of FMLA leave,
or else to forgo FMLA protection for the
lateness.  However, the employer may
not charge the employee with the use of
30 minutes of FMLA leave if the
employee actually works during any of
that time.56
The revised Regulations also clarify
some matters involving the interplay
between FMLA leave and employees'
use of "light duty" work.  First, the
Regulations make clear that the time
an injured employee spends in a light-
duty position cannot be counted
against the employee's FMLA entitle-
ment, since while doing "light duty"
work the employee is not on leave.57
On the other hand, an employee who
returns from an FMLA leave in a
temporary light-duty capacity retains
the FMLA right to return to the
employee's regular job when the
employee is able to accept full-duty
work again, as long as the employee's
ability to return to the regular job
occurs no more than a year after the
employee began the FMLA leave.58
Finally, the revised FMLA Regula-
tions prescribe new notice forms that
employers may use to fulfill their duty
to timely inform employees of their
FMLA rights, whether they are
eligible for requested FMLA leave,
what their rights and responsibilities
are in connection with an FMLA leave,
and whether the employer is treating a
particular absence as FMLA leave.59
In addition, the revised Regulations
prescribe new medical certification
forms, one for use in connection with
leave for an employee's own serious
health condition and another for use in
connection with leave to care for an ill
family member.60
D. Practical Significance of
These FMLA Changes
Employers and labor organizations
must become familiar with the new
bases for FMLA leave – military
exigency and military caregiver
situations – established in the 2008
FMLA Amendments. They also should
analyze how the new leave provisions
may affect their existing labor
agreements, if any.  Employers also
must prepare for the administrative
problems that may be posed by needing
to keep track of employees' FMLA
usage according to different, and
possibly conflicting, 12-month periods.
The revised FMLA regulations also
should be studied for how they may
affect efforts to fairly and effectively
enforce attendance, paid time off and
other leave policies without running
afoul of the FMLA.  Employers should
make use of the new notice and
medical certification forms.  Finally,
the ability to require employee
compliance with proper call-in policies
and on the increments of leave used,
and the ability to more readily obtain
clarification of confusing or incom-
plete medical certificates, may help
employers in policing absence abuse or
the misuse of leave.
IV. The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
On January 29, 2009, the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 ("Fair
Pay Act") became law, in one of the
first bill signings by the then-new
Obama Administration.61   Represent-
ing a Congressional reaction to the
U.S. Supreme Court's 2007 decision in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co.,62  the Fair Pay Act makes a
significant change affecting the
timeliness of claims that allege pay
and benefits-related discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,63 the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967,64 the
Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990,65 and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.66 In the Ledbetter case, the
Court upheld the dismissal of a
plaintiff's complaint of wage discrimi-
nation because the wage disparities
the plaintiff complained about stemmed
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from allegedly discriminatory perfor-
mance ratings that the plaintiff had
received years earlier, well outside the
300-day period in which Title VII
requires EEOC charges to be filed.67
A. Impact on Limitations
Periods for Discrimination
Claims
The Fair Pay Act provides that the
EEOC charge-filing periods under
Title VII, the ADA and the ADEA begin
to run not only when an allegedly
discriminatory pay-setting decision
(like the performance appraisals in the
Ledbetter case) is made, but also on
each subsequent date when an
individual is affected by an application
of such a decision.  In other words, the
statute of limitations continually
restarts and does not toll.  The Fair
Pay Act accomplishes this by
inserting the following provision into
each of the affected statutes:
[A]n unlawful practice occurs,
with respect to discrimination in
compensation in violation of this
Act, when a discriminatory com-
pensation decision or other prac-
tice is adopted, when a person
becomes subject to a discrimina-
tory compensation decision or
other practice, or when a person is
affected by application of a
discriminatory compensation deci-
sion or other practice, including
each time wages, benefits or other
compensation is paid, resulting in
whole or part from such a decision
or other practice.68
The Fair Pay Act also makes that
change retroactive, to cover claims
that were pending on or after May 28,
2007.69   Although the Act thus allows
claims to be based on decisions
occurring years before an EEOC
charge is filed, it retains the statutory
provisions limiting potential backpay
to the period beginning no more than
two years before a Title VII or ADA
charge was filed.70   For ADEA cases,
backpay remains limited to a period
beginning two or three years before
suit is filed.71
The wording of the Fair Pay Act,
providing that a new "unlawful
practice" occurs each time an
individual is affected by "a discrimina-
tory compensation decision or other
practice," has given rise to concerns
that the Act may eviscerate the statute
of limitations not just for pay
discrimination claims, but more
broadly for claims involving "other
practices" that could go well beyond
pay and benefit matters.  The case law
will determine to what extent those
concerns are well-founded, and hope-
fully will flesh out how far the Fair Pay
Act actually goes in permitting
present-day claims that turn on events
from long ago.  Limited guidance may
be provided by a few early decisions.
For example, in Goodlett v. State of
Delaware, the court reasoned that an
employee's allegations, "that [he] and
other Black employees [were] system-
atically paid less than similarly-
situated White employees" as a result
of annual pay-setting decisions that
Delaware had made starting years
earlier, represented the very sort of
claim that the Fair Pay Act sought to
make actionable with every effected
paycheck.72    Thus, the court held that
"Goodlett's pay disparity claim sur-
vives to the extent it relates to the
period of 300 days prior to his EEOC
filing."73
On the other hand, in Richards v.
Johnson & Johnson, Inc.,74   a court
held that a series of uncomplimentary
annual performance appraisals that
the plaintiff received beginning in the
year 2000, and which allegedly
impaired his ability to secure
subsequent promotions within the
company, were not actionable under
his September 2007 EEOC charge.
The court noted that, in National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII
bars litigation over "discrete acts of
discrimination or retaliation" like
hirings, firings and promotions "that
occur outside the statutory [300-day
charge-filing] period."75    The Richards
court then observed:
While the [Fair Pay] Act certainly
contains expansive language in
superseding the holding in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., it does not purport to
overturn Morgan, and thus does
not save otherwise untimely
claims outside the discriminatory
compensation context.76
In Gentry v. Jackson State
University,77 a court reached a conclu-
sion apparently inconsistent with
Richards.  The plaintiff in Gentry filed
an EEOC charge in 2006 complaining
about the University's 2004 decision to
deny the plaintiff tenure, which also
denied her a salary increase.78
Although it might appear that the
University's tenure decision in Gentry's
case represented a "discrete act" akin
to one of the promotion decisions in
Richards, the Gentry court reasoned
that "the denial of tenure, which
plaintiff has contended negatively
affected her compensation, qualifies as
a 'compensation decision' or 'other
practice' affecting compensation within
the . . . Fair Pay Act."79  The court
therefore denied the University's
motion for summary judgment.80
Even where the Fair Pay Act
permits litigation over pay-setting
decisions or other pay-affecting events
which may have occurred long before
the filing of an EEOC charge, plaintiffs
must prove that those long-ago
decisions or events were discrimina-
tory.  The significance of that burden
is illustrated by the decision in Bush v.
Orange County Corrections Depart-
ment,81    in which female correctional
officers complained of current pay
discrepancies allegedly resulting from
events that occurred some 16 years
earlier when they suffered wage
reductions on transferring from
nursing positions.  Although the court
held that the Bush plaintiffs' claims
were saved by the Fair Pay Act from
being untimely, the court nevertheless
7
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awarded summary judgment to the
employer, because the plaintiffs lacked
evidence that the pay adjustments 16
years earlier actually were discrimi-
natory.82
B. Practical Significance of the
Fair Pay Act
By permitting discriminatory pay
and benefit claims under federal anti-
discrimination statutes to harken
back indefinitely to long-ago events
allegedly giving rise to the com-
plained-of current pay disparities, the
Fair Pay Act makes it  critical for
employers and labor organizations to
ensure the propriety of their decisions
affecting pay and benefits when those
decisions are made.  It is simply no
longer the case that a possibly unfair
or ill-considered decision will lose its
legal significance, and become effec-
tively immune from challenge, once
300 days has elapsed.  Now, a party
may be called upon to defend actions
that occurred years earlier if those
actions can be said to affect
compensation or benefit amounts paid
today or within the past 300 days.
Accordingly, employers and unions
should review their collective bargain-
ing agreements and pay practices to
ensure that existing practices are fair
and unbiased, and to analyze what
adjustments might be in order if the
procedures or their results seem
problematic.  Wherever compensation
is affected by employee performance
appraisals or other supervisory assess-
ments of employees' talents and career
prospects, employers must ensure
proper oversight of that decision-
making and redouble measures to
train supervisors in, and hold them
accountable for, unbiased and defen-
sible assessments.  Much more is at
stake in these situations in the wake of
the Fair Pay Act.  Where previously
most pay discrimination claims were
small cases involving relatively little
money, now seemingly unfair pay-
setting decisions  may be unearthed
long after the fact, and may lend
themselves to class-wide claims of pay
discrimination involving years of
backpay, compensatory and punitive
damages, and attorneys' fees for
potentially large numbers of employ-
ees.
In addition, employers may want to
at least consider undertaking scien-
tific compensation or "pay equity"
audits, to analyze whether current
compensation patterns among em-
ployees might be said to reflect possible
unlawful discrimination originating
years ago.  Undertaking such an audit
poses risks for an employer, since even
if measures are taken to allow the
audit to be treated as privileged, the
audit results eventually may be used
against the employer.  But on the other
side of the scale, once an apparent pay
disparity is rectified, thereby bringing
to an end the distribution of potentially
problematic paychecks, the 300-day
limitations period for filing an EEOC
charge will finally begin to run,
insulating the disparity from chal-
lenge ten months after the date of the
last possibly infected paycheck.
V. 2009 Cobra Subsidies
As part of the federal "Stimulus
Package" to bolster or restart the U.S.
economy, the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 200983  ("ARRA")
effected a temporary reduction in the
amount of the premiums that eligible
individuals can be required to pay for
what is commonly called "COBRA"
continuation coverage of employer-
provided group health insurance.  The
COBRA premium reduction applies to
group health plans sponsored by state
and local government employers
subject to the Public Health Service
Act as well as to the ERISA plans of
private sector employers.84   The full
subsidy applies in favor of taxpayers
having modified adjusted gross in-
comes of up to $125,000 (or $250,000
for joint tax filers) and in reduced
amounts for taxpayers whose modified
adjusted gross incomes are between
$125,000 and $145,000 ($250,000 to
$290,000 for joint filers).85   Qualifying
individuals are eligible for the
premium reduction if their COBRA
rights were or are triggered by a
covered employee's involuntary termi-
nation of employment between Sep-
tember 1, 2008 and December 31,
2009.86   In such a case the premium
reduction is accomplished by requir-
ing the employer to pay only 35
percent of what the individual's
COBRA premium otherwise would be,
for up to nine months.87
Effective April 6, 2009, the U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL) published
an extensive guidance for employers
concerning the COBRA premium
reduction program, available on the
DOL website.88  (,"DOL Guidance").
The DOL Guidance explains the
specific notices that health plans are
required to give qualified beneficiaries
(a general notice to eligible individuals
who experience a qualifying COBRA
event during the applicable period, and
a notice of an extended COBRA election
period to eligible individuals who had a
qualifying event on or after September
1, 2008 but before the ARRA became
effective in February 2009).89  The
DOL has developed model forms for
those notices.90   The DOL Guidance
also addresses how to handle any
overpayments of COBRA payments
that qualified beneficiaries may make,
and the appeal rights that employees
have if their employers find them
ineligible or otherwise deny their
requests for premium reductions.91
Some challenging questions may
arise in connection with the COBRA
premium reduction program. For
example, an Internal Revenue Service
guidance (Notice 2009-27)92  addresses
questions concerning what constitutes
an "involuntary termination" making
an employee eligible for the premium
subsidy, explaining that the term
includes not only garden-variety
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discharges but also an employer's
failure to renew an individual's
contract, as well as an individual's
election to terminate employment for
good reason because of the employer's
material negative change in the
employee's circumstances.93 How-
ever, according to the IRS guidance, an
"involuntary termination" does not
occur merely because an employee
becomes unable to work due to a
disability, unless the employer termi-
nates his or her employment for that
reason.94   An employee's voluntary
election to quit, pursuant to an
employer's offer of a severance or buy-
out package, may qualify as an
"involuntary termination" if the
employer indicates, when making the
severance offer, that a certain number
of employees will be terminated if
insufficient numbers accept the
separation package.95
The IRS guidance also indicates
that the 35 percent premium subsidy
applies to whatever COBRA premium
amount an employee otherwise would
be required to pay, even if, pursuant to
a pre-existing policy or a special
severance offer, the employer already
subsidizes some of the premium.96
Thus, for example, if an employer
independently offers to pay 60 percent
of the COBRA premium for an
employee who accepts a separation
package, the ARRA premium reduc-
tion applies to the remaining 40
percent that the employee otherwise
would have to pay, meaning that the
40 percent portion must be subsidized
by 35 percent, leaving the employee to
pay only 26 percent of the unreduced
COBRA premium for the nine months
of the ARRA subsidy period.97
VI. Paycheck Fairness Act
A federal measure that has not yet
passed Congress, but which has
momentum and has been described as
a rightful companion to the Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act, is the similarly-titled
"Paycheck Fairness Act."98   Pending
in Congress as S. 182 and H.R. 12, the
Paycheck Fairness Act would amend
the Equal Pay Act of 196399  which,
although administered by the EEOC,
was left unaffected by the Fair Pay
Act.  The Equal Pay Act forbids
covered employers, including covered
public employers, to pay unequal
wages to male as compared to female
employees who perform substantially
equal work in the same establish-
ment.100
Unlike the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,
the Paycheck Fairness Act would not
expressly alter the limitations period
for Equal Pay Act claims, or provide
that such claims arise anew with each
paycheck,101 although such an ap-
proach may be inherent in the Equal
Pay Act in any event.  What the
Paycheck Fairness Act will do, if
enacted, is revise the damages
available in Equal Pay Act cases
(currently confined to back wages for
two or three years, possibly doubled as
liquidated damages, a la the FLSA and
ADEA)102   to also permit compensatory
and punitive damage awards.103    This
would make Equal Pay Act remedies
similar in kind to those available
under Title VII and the ADA, except
that compensatory and punitive
damages currently are capped for Title
VII and ADA claims, with the caps
based on the size of the employer,104
whereas the Paycheck Fairness Act,
in its present form at least, includes no
such caps.105    The Paycheck Fairness
Act also would modify the Equal Pay
Act to allow "opt-out" class actions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23,106 instead of only allowing "opt-in"
collective actions of the type now
permitted in ADEA and FLSA cases.107
It remains to be seen whether the
Paycheck Fairness Act will follow the
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and the other
changes discussed above, to become
law in the near term as its proponents
seek.  Because the real impact of the
Paycheck Fairness Act concerns only
available remedies, rather than mat-
ters of substance, its prospects may
have relatively little significance.
After all, Title VII already forbids pay
discrimination based on sex and allows
the sorts of remedies and class actions
that the Paycheck Fairness Act would
authorize.  Employers may take some
comfort in the limited practical
significance of the Paycheck Fairness
Act.  In light of the other developments
highlighted above, however, employ-
ers have plenty of substantive federal
regulatory changes to digest as it is.
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IELRA Developments
In Southwest Suburban Federation of
Teachers, AFT Local 943, IFT, AFL-
Recent
Recent Developments is a regular
feature of The Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent
legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations commu-
nity. This issue focuses on developments
under the two collective bargaining
statutes and the equal employment
opportunity laws.
CIO v. Thornton Fractional Town-
ship High School District 215, Case
No. 2008-CA-0003-C (IELRB 2009),
the IELRB upheld an ALJ's determi-
nation that Thornton Fractional
Township High School District 215
violated Section 14(a)(5) and (1) of the
IELRA by unilaterally changing the
status quo of how the 12 month
schedule would be awarded in the
Guidance Office, without notice to or
negotiation with the Southwest
Suburban Federation of Teachers,
AFT Local 943, IFT. The ALJ found
that the the district further violated
the IELRA by refusing to bargain the
issue when the union raised it, and by
refusing to award the 12 month
position to the most senior secretary in
the Guidance Office, Carmen Mureiko.
In February 2005, the district
announced that, due to a budget
deficit, "[a]ll 12 month building
secretaries will be reduced to 10 1/2
months except the principal secretary
and the senior guidance secretary."
When the new school year began,
schedules were reduced accordingly
and the 12 month schedule was
retained by the senior secretary in
each office.
In June 2006, the union was
certified as the collective bargaining
representative for most of the clerical
employees; Mureiko was included in
the bargaining unit and served as vice
president and grievance officer for the
union. In February  2007, Mureiko
addressed a bargaining session fo-
cused on increasing hours for clerical
workers, at which time the district
refused to bargain over the issue and
warned Mureiko to "be careful what
she wished for."
In May 2007, Mureiko became the
most senior employee in the guidance
office.  Mureiko was told at that time
by her supervisor that she would be
assigned the 12 month schedule
because she was now the most senior
employee.  Despite this assertion, the
12 month schedule was given to the
employee chosen to fill the position
Duty to Bargain
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held by the prior senior employee, who
had less seniority than Mureiko.  The
issue was later raised in a bargaining
meeting, at which time the district
stated that Mureiko would "never" get
the 12 month position. The union filed
the unfair labor charge, and the ALJ
found that the district had violated §§
14(a)(5) and (1) by unilaterally chang-
ing the status quo and refusing to
bargain the assignment of the 12
month schedule to a less-senior
employee than Mureiko, and that the
district had violated § 14(a)(3) by
refusing to assign a 12-month
schedule to Mureiko because of her
union activity.
The district filed a timely exception
to the 14(a)(5) and (1) charges,
claiming that no status quo had ever
been established. The IELRB, how-
ever, found that the district's written
statement regarding the assignment
of the 12 month schedule and its
consistent past practice of assigning
the 12 month schedule to the most
senior secretary clearly established a
status quo, which the district
unilaterally changed when it assigned
a 12 month schedule to a less-senior
employee. The district also claimed
that it had  bargained the decision to
assign the 12 month schedule to an
employee less-senior than Mureiko.
The IELRB found that, while the
district had been willing to engage in
discussion of the secretarial schedules
generally, it refused to bargain the
specific decision in question. The
Board affirmed the ALJ's decision on
both counts.
The district also filed a timely
exception to the 14(a)(3) finding,
claiming that it did not assign the
12-month schedule to a less-senior
employee than Mureiko because of
Mureiko's union activities.  Noting
that anti-union animus may be
inferred, the threatening remakes
made by the district during negotia-
tions regarding Mureiko's assign-
ment, the suspicious timing of the
decision, and the district's failure to
provide any justification for refusing
to assign the 12 month schedule to
Mureiko despite her seniority, the
Board affirmed the ALJ's determina-
tion that the District acted on anti-
union animus.
In McDaniel and County of Cook/
Sheriff of Cook County, Case No. L-
CA-08-048 (ILRB Local Panel, 2009),
and its companion case, Morris and
County of Cook/Sheriff of Cook
County, Case No. L-CA-08-049 (ILRB
Local Panel, 2009),  the Local Panel
upheld an ALJ's finding that the
employer violated section 10(a)(1) of
the IPLRA when it suspended two
Correctional Officers for engaging in
protected concerted activity.
On November 10, 2007, the
employer ordered Correctional Offic-
ers McDaniel and Morris to transport
15 arrestees from the Markham
courthouse to the Cook County Jail.
One of the arrestees was infected with
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus ("MRSA").  While in the  past
officers had transported MRSA-
infected prisoners only after treatment
and clearance from Cook County
medical staff, in this case the
paperwork proving the treatment and
clearance was not attached to the
arrestee's court order or among his
personal property. Although Officer
Morris reported the missing documen-
tation to a superior, he and Officer
McDaniel were nonetheless ordered to
transport the infected arrestee to Jail.
They refused because of the risk of
contagion to other arrestees, and were
each suspended without pay for 29
days.
In upholding the ALJ's finding
that the employer violated section
10(a)(1), the Local Panel cited City of
Chicago and Mulligan, 11 PERI 3008
(ILLRB 1995), which held that
employees engage in protected activity
when, in concert, they refuse to work
under conditions they believe to be
unsafe. Reviewing the record, the
Panel held that the officers clearly
demonstrated that their refusal to
transport the arrestee was a safety-
based, protected concerted activity,
and that the record further demon-
strated that the employer suspended
the officers because of that activity.
The Panel ordered the employer to
cease and desist from disciplining the
officers and ordered make-whole relief.
In its exceptions before the Panel,
the employer argued that a safety-
based refusal-to-work should be
protected activity only if an employee
reasonably believes obedience would
result in imminent death or injury.  It
also urged that objective evidence
should show that working conditions
might reasonably be considered ab-
normally dangerous, that is, present
some identifiable, presently existing
threat to safety.  While the Panel
declined to follow the employer's
suggestion to so limit safety-based
refusals-to-work, it did so only by
dismissing the employer's cited
authorities as procedurally distinct
and unsupportive of its position.
Thus, the Panel's opinion stopped
short of leaving the safety-based
refusal-to-work impregnable from this
line of attack.
In Metropolitan Alliance of Police
and Village of McCook, Case No. S-CA-
06-097 (ILRB State Panel, 2009), the
State Panel considered whether a
petition for certification filed by police
officers was a motivating factor in the
village's pay reduction for officer court
appearances. It upheld the ALJ's
dismissal of the complaint, agreeing
that the union had failed to establish a
causal link between the pay reduction
and the petition for the certification.
In May 2005, as part of an overtime
pay reduction plan, the village began
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instructing certain officers not to
attend court if it concluded their
presence was unnecessary.  In July,
the police chief told a sergeant that
police overtime pay exceeded that of
other departments, and that pay for all
court appearances would be reduced by
about 40 percent.  In August, patrol
officers and sergeants filed a represen-
tation petition with the ILRB.  Shortly
after the ILRB certified the union, the
police chief notified the officers that
the pay reduction for all court
appearances was effective.
In upholding the ALJ's dismissal of
the complaint, the State Panel
distinguished alleged 10(a)(1) viola-
tion cases involving employer threats
in response to employee protected
activity  from those involving em-
ployer acts. While the Panel recog-
nized that threat cases require that
the charging party show that the
threat would objectively have the
effect of coercing, restraining, or
interfering with the exercise of
protected rights to prove a 10(a)(1)
violation, act cases require proof  that
the employer was illegally motivated
in fact.  In such cases, the Panel
emphasized, the proper motivation
analysis tracks that used in cases
alleging violations of the right to en-
gage in union activity under § 10(a)(2),
where the motive requirement is
satisfied only by showing that the
employer's actions were prompted by
the protected activity.
The Panel explained that illegal
motivation could be proved circum-
stantially, such as through the
employer's expressed hostility towards
organized activities, proximity in time
of the employer's action and the
protected activity, and shifting expla-
nations for the employer activity.
However, the Panel invoked precedent
for the proposition that timing alone,
without further supporting proof, is
insufficient to establish illegal motiva-
tion.  Because the State Panel agreed
with the ALJ's observation that the
union's proof of causation depended





In Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658
(2009) the Supreme Court held that
the City of New Haven, Connecticut
discriminated against white and
Hispanic firefighters who likely would
have been promoted to lieutenant or
captain but for the city's decision to
avoid risking disparate impact liabil-
ity, by throwing out the results of
examinations it otherwise would have
used in considering the promotions.
The city hired a test development
company to ensure that the examina-
tion screened those applicants best
qualified for senior positions. The
company intentionally oversampled
minorities in every stage of develop-
ment to ensure that the examinations
would not unintentionally favor
whites.  However, the great majority of
the test results favored whites, and the
city opted to ignore the results rather
than risk disparate impact liability.
The Court found that the city had
violated Title VII’s disparate treat-
ment provision when it disregarded
the test results when the only evidence
supporting disparate impact liability
was that which would suffice to
establish a prima facie case, that is, a
threshold showing of a significant
statistical disparity.  If the city could
have mustered more and stronger
evidence of its potential disparate
impact liability, intentional discrimi-
nation on the basis of race would have
been justified so as to avoid the
disparate impact liability.
Under Title VII's standard dispar-
ate impact proof scheme, once an
alleged discriminatee has pleaded a
prima facie case by showing that a
facially-neutral policy or practice has
a statistically-significant impact on  a
protected class, the employer may
rebut the prima facie case by showing
that the policy or practice is job-related
and consistent with business
necessity. If the employer is success-
ful, the plaintiff may still prove
discrimination by showing that the
employer rejected a feasible available
alternative policy or practice that
would have had less of an adverse
effect than the one chosen.
In the context of this standard of
proof, Ricci means that in cases where
an employer risks disparate impact
liability, intentional protected class
discrimination will be justified if the
employer can show that its policy or
practice is not job-related or consistent
with business necessity, or that it
rejected a feasible, but less discrimina-
tory alternative.  To any complaint of
disparate treatment, therefore, an
employer can answer that its action is
directed at remedying an unintention-
ally discriminatory work regime.
Ricci implies that such an answer
might sometimes be sufficient to avoid
Title VII's disparate treatment liabil-
ity.
By finding the City of New Haven
liable for disparate treatment, how-
ever, the Court assured potential
disparate treatment plaintiffs that its
strong-basis-in-evidence standard
would not cause employers to fish for
discriminatory flaws in their policies
and practices to defend against such
claims.  The Court reviewed the record
before it and found that the city's
painstaking test development process
belied its claims that the exams were
not job-related and were inconsistent
with the necessities of its fire
department.  In other words, the Court
implicitly reasoned that an employer
that implements policies and practices
properly-cognizant of the risk of
disparate impact liability, will pre-
cisely thereby bunker itself against
disparate treatment — both from the
inside and without.
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